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Cross-country  regressions  should  not  be used to predict by how
much long-run  growth  will change  when policies  change  - at
best,  they suggest  interesting  empirical  regularities.  But beliefs
about  policy  and growth  that  are not  supported  by cross-country
evidence  will tend  to be viewed  skeptically.
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Growth?  "I. INTRODUCTION
Economists  have  been  seeking  to comprehend  why some  countries  are
rich and  others  poor  for  well over  200  years. A better  understanding  of
the  national  policies  associated  with long-run  growth  would  both
contribute  to our  ability  to explain  cross  country  differences  in  per
capita  incomes  and  provide  a basis  for  making  policy  recommendations  that
could  lead  to improvements  in human  welfare. Recently,  economists  have
used cross  country  regressions  to search  for  empirical  linkages  between
long-run  growth  and  indicators  of national  policies  (e.g.,  Roger  Kormendi
and  Philip  Meguire,  1985;  Robert  J. Barro,  1991). The  large  cross
country  growth  literature  has identified  various  fiscal,  monetary,  trade,
exchange  rate,  and financial  policy  indicators  that  are  significantly
correlated  with long-run  growth. Yet,  Ross  Levine  and  David  Renelt
(1992)  show  that  many of these  findings  are  fragile  to small  alterations
in  the conditioning  information  set. That is,  small  changes  in the
right-hand-side  variables  produce  different  conclusions  regarding  the
relationship  between  individual  policies  and  growth. This  paper's
purpose  is to take  stock  of  what the  profession  has learned  from  cross
country  regression  studies  of the  linkages  between  long-run  growth  and
indicators  of monetary,  fiscal,  exchange  rate,  trade,  and financial
policies.
1.  Why  use cross-countrv  regressions?
To  gauge  what  we  have  learned  - and  may  potentially  learn  - from
cross  country  regressions,  we should  humbly  face  the  daunting  array  of
methodological,  conceptual,  and  measurement  problems  that  plague  our
ability  to interpret  cross-country  growth  regressions  confidently  (see
Levine  and  Renelt  (1991)). While  the  title  of this  paper  is "Looking  at
the Facts  ... ,"  the inherent problems associated  with cross-country2
studies  imply  that,  at  best,  we  can  only  expect  to  unearth  suggestive
empirical  regularities.  Even  settin8  aside  measurement  difficulties  and
issues  of  data  consistency  across  countries  and  time,  numerous
interpretational  problems  plague  cross-country  investigations.  It  is  not
clear  that  we  should  include  vastly  different  countries  in  the  same
regression.  Regression  analysis  presupposes  that  observations  are  drawn
from  a distinct  population,  but  as  argued  by  Arnold  Harberger  (1987),
Thailand,  the  Dominican  Republic,  Zimbabwe,  Greece,  and  Bolivia  may  have
little  in  common  that  merits  their  being  put  in  the  same  regression.
Thus,  the  statistical  basis  upon  which  we  draw  inferences  from  cross
country  analyses  may  be  in  doubt.
Furthermore,  it  ic  conceptually  difficult  to  interpret  the
coefficients  on  regressions  that  involve  data  for  over  100  countries
averaged  over  thirty  years  during  which  time  business  cycles,  policy
changes,  and  political  disturbances  have  influenced  economic  activity.
Many  papers  interpret  the  coefficients  as  elasticities,  suggesting  that
if  a  policy  indicator  changes  by  one  percent,  growth  will  change  by  a
percent  corresponding  to  the  coefficient  on  the  policy  indicator.  These
types  of  conceptual  experiments  should  be  treated  skeptically  as crose
country  regressions  do  not  resolve  causal  issues,  nor  do  the  regressions
"..  describe  a  single  piece  of  machinery  through  time."  (Harberger,
1987,  p.  256) Cross  country  regressions  should  be  viewed  as  evaluating
the  strength  of  partial  correlations  and  not  as  behavioral  relationships
tvi-t  suggest  how  much  growth  will  change  when  policies  change.
"Looking  at  the  facts"  becomes  even  more  opaque  when  the  objects  of
analysis  are  national  policies.  In  theoretical  models  of  policy  and
growth,  economists  typically  represent  policy  distortions  with  the  greek
letter  tau. Not  only  do  international  data  sets  such  as  the
International  Financial  Statistics  and  the  Sumuers  and  Heston  (1988)  data
not  contain  data  series  called  tau,  but it is  very difficult  to construct3
proxies  that  measure  policy  actions.  Instead  of  measuring  executable
policies,  cross  country  regressions  use  policy  indicators,  such  as  the
average  ratio  of  exports  to  GDP  or  the  average  ratio  of  broad  money  to
GDP  over  the  past  30  years.  Cross  country  regressions,  therefore,  do  not
typically  link  executable  policies  with  growth.'
The  inherent  statistical  end  conceptual  obstacles  to  interpreting
cross  country  studies  limit  what  economists  can  learn  about  policy  and
growth  from  cross  country  regressions.  Even  if  cross  country  regressions
yield  very  "strong"  results,  these  results  should  be  viewed  as  suggestive
empirical  regularities,  not  as  stylized  facts  nor  as  behavioral
relationships  on  which  to  measure  responses  to  policy  changes.  Cross
country  regressions,  however,  can  be  very  useful.  Along  with  other
analytical  methods,  demonstrating  that  certain  policy-growth
relationships  hold  well  across  countries  will  influence  beliefs  about
policy  and  economic  performance.  Similarly,  beliefs  about  policy  and
growth  that  are  not  supported  by  cross  country  evidence  will  tend  to  be
viewed  skeptically.
2.  Back  to  the  "facts"
To  examine  the  strength  of  the  empirical  relationship  between  long-
run  growth  end  various  policy  indicators,  we  slightly  modify  the  approach
taken  in  Levine  and  Renelt  (1992),  henceforth  LR. LR  examine  whether  the
conclusions  from  existing  cross-country  studies  of  growth  and  policy  are
robust  or  fragile  to  small  alterations  in  the  conditioning  set  of
information,  i.e.,  do  slight  alterations  in  the  right-hand-side  iariables
change  the  results  for  the  variables  of  primary  interest?  LR  examine  the
relationship  between  economic  growth  and  a  wide  assortment  of  fiscal
expenditure,  fiscal  revenue,  monetary,  trade,  and  exchange  rate  policy
indicators  as  well  as  political  and  economic  stability  indexes  for  a
broad  cross-section  of  countries  over  the  1960-89  and  1974-89  periods.4
They  find that  almost  all  cross-country  regression  results  are sensitive
to minor  alterations  in the  conditioning  set  of  variables.
This  paper  has  three  parts. The first  part  modifies  the  LR
analysis  in four  ways.  First,  based  on  work by  King and  Levine
(1992a,b,c,d),  we include  indicators  of the  level  of domestic  financial
sector  development  that  were not  included  in  LR.  Second,  based  on  work
by Jong-wha  Lee (International  Monetary  Fund),  we use an improved  measure
of the  black  market  premium. Third,  based  on Easterly  and  Rebelo  (1993),
we use  a  measure  of the  total  public  sector  surplus. Fourth,  we U63  a
reduced  form  specification  based  on  Barro (1991)  since  these  "Barro-
style"  regressions  are frequently  used.'
We find  a few  robust  regularities.  FLrst,  various  indicators  of
financial  sector  development  are  robustly  associated  with long-run  growth
(as  first  noted  by  King and  Levine  (1992c)). Second,  unlike  LR, the
black  market  exchange  rate  premium  is  negatively  related  to long-run
growth  in the "Barro-style"  regression  framework  used in tili  paper.
Third,  as in  LR,  a host of  monetary,  fiscal,  and trade  indicators  are  not
robustly  related  to growth  even  in the  Barro-framework.
The second  part of this  paper  studies  the  relationship  between
inflation  and  growth. Here  we move beyond  simply  altering  the
conditioning  information  set. After  demonstrating  that  inflation  and
growth  are  not strongly  correlated  in simple  regressions,  we attempt  to
discover  whether  the  relationship  between  growth  and  inflation  is
different  in "very"  high inflation  countries  as opposed  to countries  with
more "moderate"  inflation  rates. This  allows  us to illustrate  c number
of additional  difficulties  - such  as defining  "outliers"  and  altering  the
sample  of  countries  - associated  with attempting  to draw interpretable
results  from  cross-country  regressions. We find  that  although  economists
would  almost  unanimously  argue  that  high  inflation  is  bad for  growth,
this  result  is  difficult  to find  in a  broad  cross-section  of countries.5
Finally,  instead  of  focusing  on  the  partial  correlation  between
individual  policy  indicators  and  growth,  we  construct  three  indexes
designed  to  characterize  the  macroeconomic,  international,  and  dometic
financial  sector  onvironments.  These  three  indexes  are  constructed  by
combining  individual  policy  indicators.  In  this  way,  we  attempt  to
broaden  the  scope  of  our  analysis  by  moving  away  from  the  narrow  focus  on
indiviual  Indicators  and  moving  toward,  for  example,  an  overall  index  of
macroeconomic  stability.  Furthermore,  using  these  overall  indexes,  we
study  policy  regimes.  By  classifying  countries  as  having  "good"  or  "bad"
financial,  macroeconomic,  and  international  policies,  we  can  categorize
countries  into  eight  different  "regimes."  The  investigation  of  policy
regimes  suggests  that  the  state  of  the  financial  sector  is  importantly
associated  with  long-run  growth  and  the  overall  index  of  macroeconomic
stability  is  more  strongly  linked  vith  growth  than  any  individual  fiscal
or  monetary  indicator.
II.  EXTREME  BOUNDS  ANALYSIS
1.  Motivation
Previous  cross-country  growth  analyses  identify  over  fifty
different  policy  and  political  indicators  as  significantly  correlated
with  long-run  per  capita  growth  rates.' Are  these  results  believable?
Should  they  change  our  views  and  policies?  To  answer  these  questions,  we
need  an  empirical  definition  of  "believable."  Levine  and  Renelt  (1992)
(LR)  use  a  narrow  definition  to  show  that  most  existing  "empirit  al  facts"
are  not  believable.  Their  definition  of  believable  is  derived  from
Edward Leamer's  work  on  extreme  bounds  analysis  (EBA).'  Basically,  LR
show  that  small  alterations  in  the  conditioning  information  set,  i *e,
small  alterations  in  the  right-hand-side  variables,  change  the
statistical  significance  of  most  existing  results.  LR term  results  that6
do  not  withstand  small  alterations  in  the  conditioning  information  set
"fragile"  and  those  results  that  do  withstand  there  alterations  "robust."
Furthermore,  LR  show  that  past  results  typically  rely  on  searching  beyond
standard  regression  specifications  to  find  the  "right"  set  of  right-hand-
side  variables  that  produce  "good"  results.  We  use  the  LR  approach  to
further  investigate  the  robustness  of  partial  correlations  between  growth
rates  and  "policy"  variables  over  the  1960-1989  period  for  broad  crose-
section  of  about  100  coun'ries.
2.  Techniue
The  EBA  employs  the  linear,  ordinary  least  squares  regression
framework:
GPW aPI  +  PON+,Z  U  (1)
where  GYP  is  the  growth  rate  in  GDP  per  capita  averaged  over  the  1960-
1989  period  for  a  cross-section  of  up  to  100  countries,  I  is  a  set  of
base  variables  always  included  in  the  regression,  M is  the  variable  of
particular  analytical  interest,  and  Z is  a  set  of  variables  chosen  from  a
pool  of  variables  that  we  believe  represent  appropriate  conditioning
information.  The  EBA  involves  varying  the  Z  variables  to  determine
whether  the  coefficient  on  the  N  variable  is  consistently  signif_cant  and
of  the  same  sign  when  the  conditioning  information  set  varies. If  the
coefficient  on  the  N  variable  is  consistently  significant  and  of  the  same
sign  we  call  this  result  "robust."  If  the  coefficient  on  the  N variable
changes  sign  or  becomes  insignificant,  we  call  this result  "fragile."7
Our  I  variables  - the  base  set  of  variables  that  we always  include
in  the  regressions  - are  LSEC,  the  log  of  the  initial  (1960)  secondary
school  enrollment  rate,  LYO,  the  log  of  initial  real  GDP  per  capita,  and
REVC,  the  number  of  revolutions  and  coups. 5 This  is  a  different  set  of  I
variables  from  the  set  used  in  LR. We  choose  this  new  set  of  I  variables
%ecause  they  correspond  to  the  "Barro-style"  regressions  that  have  become
the  standard  cross-country  growth  regression.  Thus,  choosing  these  I
variables  facilitates  comparisons  with  other  *tudies.  We  began  by  using
the  complete  set  of  Barro  (1991)  control  variables  but  dropped  the  log  of
the  initial  p%rimary  schnol  enrollment  rate,  the  numbot  of  assassinations,
and  the  1960  average  deviation  from  unity  of  the  purchasing  power  parity
index  for  investment  goods  since  the  inclusion  of  these  variables  did  not
importantly  alter  our  findings.'  Thus,  equation  (1)  becomes
GYP - C +  PLYO  2LSEC +  3RvC  +  Pr  PIZ +  u.  (2)
First,  for  each  variable  of  interest,  X,  we  run  a  base  regression
with  only  the  basic  set  of  variables  included,  i.e.,  we  do  not  include
any  Z  variables.  This  base  regression  determines  whether  the  variable  of
interest  is  significantly  correlated  with  long-run  growth  after
controlling  for  a  base  set  of  variables  designed  to  control  for  initial
conditions  and  the  degree  of  political  stability.
Second,  we run  separate  regressions  including  each  variable  - one
at  a  time  - from  the  pool  of  potential  Z  variables  in  regression  equation
f'). Then  we  run  separate  regressions  including  every  combination  of  two
variables  from  the  pool  of  potential  Z  variables;  finally,  we  run
separate  regressions  including  every  combination  of  three  variables  from
the  pool  of  potential  Z  variables.  Out  of  all  of  these  regressions,  we8
compute  the  extreme  upper  and  lower  bound  on  the  coefficient  Sm. The
extreme  upper  bound  is  equal  to  the  Lighest  calculated  value  of  A6  + 2  *
the  standard  error  of  0A;  the  extreme  lower  bound  is  the  lowest
calculated  value  of  fi3  - 2  *  the  standard  error  of  4*.  For  example,  In
some  cases  the  addition  of  only  one  Z  variable  may  produce  the  extreme
upper  bound  for  A,,  while  the  addition  of  thr-e  Z  variables  produces  the
extreme  lower  bound.
These  extreme  bounds  can  help  clarify  the  degree  of  confidence  that
one  can  place  in  the  partial  correlation  between  growth  (GYP)  and  the  H
variable.  If  a  policy  indlcator  is  robustly  correlated  with  long-run
growth,  then  one  should  feel  more  confident  about  its  association  with
growth  than  an  indicator  which  has  a  fragile  link. If  a  result  is
fragile,  the  following  cables  will  also  Indicate  how  many  and  which  Z
variables  are  causing  the  "weakness."  For  instance,  If  a  result  is
classified  as  fragile:  0,  the  zero  indicates  that  the  M  variable  is
insignificant  without  adding  any  additional  Z  variables;  I.  e.,  the  M
variable  enters  insignificantly  in  the  base  rgression. If  a  result  is
classified  as  fragilet  1,  the  "one"  indicates  that  the  H  variable  is
significantly  correlated  with  growth  in  the  base  regression  but  the
inclusion  of  only  one  additional  right-hand-side  variable  causes  the
partial  correlation  between  growth  and  the  H variable  to  turn
insignificant.
The pool  of  variables  from which  ve  allow  the  BA  to  choose  Z-
variables  includes  the  average  inflation  rate  (PI),  the  standard
deviation  of  Inflation  (STPI),  the  government  tiscal  surplus  ratio  to  GDP
(T-RY),  imports  plus  exports  as  a  share  of  GDP (TRD),  the  black  market
premium  (BHP),  and  liquid  liabilities  as  a  ratio  to  GDP  (LLY),  for  a
total  of  seven  possible  Z variables. 7 We believe  this  broad  set  of
policy  indicators  represents  a  reasonable  set  of  information  upon which
to  condition  our  beliefs  regarding  the  association  between  individual9
policy  indicators  and  growth.  For  each  K variable,  this  pool  is
restricted  by  excluding  any  variable  which,  a  priori,  we think  may
measure  the  same  phenomenon.  For  example,  when  TRD  ts  the  K  variable,  we
exclude  the  black  market  premium  from  the  Z  pool  as  both  variables  may
reflect  aspects  of  international  policy.  By  eliminating  such
duplication,  we  give  each  M  variable  a better  chance  at  achieving  the
"robust"  status.
3. Fiscal  golic?  indicators
Table  1  presents  the  sensitivity  results  for  four  fiscal  policy
indicators.  Many  empirical  livestigations  Into  the  relationship  between
average  per  capita  growth  and  fiscal  policy  use  measures  of  the  size  of
government  in  the  economy and  measures  of  goverment  deficits.
Consequently,  we examine  two  of  each  of  these  types  of  fiscal  policy
indicators.
The  first  variable  GOV, the  ratio  of  government  consumption  to  GDP,
attempts  to  measure  the  role  of  the  government  In  economic  activity.
Barro  (1990)  shows  that  if  countries  are  choosing  the  optimal  amount  of
fiscal  expenditures  and  taxes,  then  the  ratio  of  government  expenditures
or  revenues  to  GDP  should  be  unrelated  to  long-run  growth.  On the  other
hand,  many policy  arguments  are  based  on  the  asumptions  that  the  size  of
government  expenditures  is  typically  larger  than  optimal  and  that
government  expenditures  are  spent  on  the  wrong  things.  However,
measuring  whether  government  spending  is  'too"  large  or  whether
expenditures  are  "mis-spent"  is  difficult.  An important  problem  with  GOV
is  that  it  is  an  aggregate  measure  of  government  size  and,  therefore,
does  not  capture  the  distribution  of  expenditures,  the  efficiency  with
which  the  government  uses  any  given  level  of  expenditures,  or  whether  the
government  size  is suboptimal.10
The  EBA  results  for  GOV  show  that  regardles  of  the  conditioning
set  of  information,  the  partial  correlation  between  GOV  and  growth  is
always  negative  but  never  significant  at  the  0.05  level.  This  may
reflect  optimal  fiscal  policy  or  that  COV  is  poorly  measured.
Further  examining  the  link  between  fiscal  policy  and  growth,  Barro
(1991,  p.  430)  argues  that  "expenditures  on  *ducatiou  and  defense  are
more  like  public  investment  then  public  consumption,"  and  therefore  he
constructs  the  variable  government  consumption  expenditures  minus
education  and  defense  expenditures  divided  by  GDP,  over  the  1970-85
period,  and  calls  this  variable  HSGVXDXE. This  variable  is also  fragile.
When  LLY,  TRD,  and  STPI  are  included  the  coefficient  on  HSGVXDXE  is
insignificant.8
In  another  attempt  to  link  government  actions  and  growth,  many
studies  examine  the  role  of  government  fiscal  surpluses  and  deficits.
Government  deficits  are  frequently  considered  bad  for  growth,  or,
sometimes,  deficits  are  viewed  as  indicative  of  structural  problems
associated  with  poor  growth.  We  use  two  measures  of  fiscal  financing  to
investigate  these  claims.  Firet,  we  study  the  ratio  of  the  central
government  surplus  to  GDP  (SURY).  The  EBA  shows  that  only  with
particular  combinations  of  explanatory  variables  does  this  variable  have
a  significant  partial  correlation  with  growth.  SURY  does  not  enter
significantly  in  the  base  regression,  but  the  LBA  finds  that  when  PI,
STPI,  LLY  are  included  the  coefficient  on  SURY  becomes  significant.  In
our  sample,  we found  two  outliers  for  the  variable  SURY  as  shown  in  Graph
I  (Bolivia  and  Israel).  Removal  of  these  countries  did  not  change  the
EBA  results.  Running  the  entire  EBA  after  first  omitting  outliers  on  all
variables  does  not  change  this  paper's  conclusions.
SURY,  however,  does  not  accurately  measure  the  size  of  the  entire
public  sector  deficit  and  may,  therefore,  be  both  incomplete  and
inconsistent  across  countries.  For  example,  in  many countries,  the11
government  owns public  enterprises  and  local  governments  and
municipalities  play  important  fiscal  roles.  Therefore,  Easterly  and
Rebelo  (1993)  calculate  a  measure  of  the  total  public  sector  surplus,
PSSUR,  in  an  attempt  to  rectify  these  measurement  problems.  As  can  be
seen  at  the  end  of  Table  l,  however,  PSSUR  is  also  fragile.  Thus,  even
when  extensive  efforts  are  made  to  measure  the  total  public  sector
surplus  in  a  consistent  fashion  across  countries,  it  is  difficult  to  find
an  insensitive  relationship  between  fiscal  financing  and  long-run  growth.
Though  all  four  of  these  fiscal  variables  enter  with  the  predicted
sign,  none  is  robust  to  slight  alterations  in  the  conditioning  set  of
information.  These  results  make  us  uncomfortable  with  using  these
(frequently  cited)  fiscal  indicators  in  making  policy  recommendations.
The  fragile  relationship  between  aggregate  fiscal  policy  indicators  and
growth,  however,  does  not  rule  out  fiscal  policy's  importance  in
affecting  long-run  growth.  Ae  mentioned  above,  these  indicators  are  not
equal  to  policieo;  they  suffer  from  measurement  problems,  and  they  may  be
too  aggregate  to  be  informative.  We  conclude  that  there  may  be  no
substitute  for  a  detailed  examination  of  the  types  of  fiscal  expenditures
and  taxes,  and  the  efficiency  with  which  government  provides  services  and
collects  taxes,  within  the  context  of  individual  country  circumstances.
4. Monetarv  nolicv  indicators
Inflation  may  be  related  to  growth  through  many  channels.  Although
we  discuss  these  channels  and  examine  the  relationship  between  inflation
and  growth  in  greater  detail  in  the  next  section,  Table  2  shows  che
results  for  two  monetary  policy  indicators,  the  average  rate  (PI)  and  the
standard  deviation  of  the  inflation  rate  (STPI).  Though  they  reflect  not
only  monetary  policy  but  also  shocks  and  other  policies,  these  have  been
widely  used  in  empirical  investigations  of  the  link  between  monetary
policy  and  growth  (see,  for  example,  Kormendi  and  MegLrire  (1985)).  The12
results  of  the  sensitivity  lnalysi  show  that  both  variables  are  fragile;
no  specification  yields  a  significant  partial  correlation.  Sven  after
removing  BMP  from  the  Z  variable  pool,  since  BMP  may  reflect  an
inconsistent  combination  of  exchange  rate  and  monetary  policies,  PI  and
STPI  remain  fragile.
5.  International  distortion  indexes
Much  theory  suggests  that  openness  to  international  trade  will  spur
economic  growth.'  Unfortunately,  there  does  not  exist  a  good  indicator
of  international  trade  policy.  In  an  impressive  empirical  paper,
Pritchett  (1991)  shows  that  most  cross-country  indicators  of  trade  policy
are  not  highly  correlated  with  themselves!  Thus,  different  trade  policy
indicators  tend  to  produce  different  rankings  of  countries  in  terms  of
openness.  Following  tradition,  we  use  the  share  of  total  trade  in  GDP
(TRDO)1  TRD  is fragile. The  addition  of LLY, the  ratio  of liquid
liabilities  to  GDP,  produces  an  insignificant  coefficient  on  TRD. As
depicted  in  Graph  2,  we  found  three  TRD  "outliers"  (Hong  Kong,
Luxembourg,  and  Malta).  When these  three  countries  are:removed  from  the
sample,  TRD  is  insignificantly  correlated  with  growth  even  in  the  base
regression.
The black  market  premium,  BMP, is  often  used  as  a  general  index  of
international  distortions.  Intuition  suggests  that  larger  black  market
premia  will  be  associated  with  slower  growth.  However,  the  black  market
premium  suffers  several  drawbacks  as  an  indicator  of  policy.  One
problem  with  the  BMP  is  that  it  is  a  general  index  of  distortion...  A
country  could  have  a  freely  floating  currency  and  zero  black  market
premium but  still  impose  severe  trade  restrictions.  Similarly,  the
combination  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  and  inflationary  monetary  policy
could  produce  a  large  black  market  exchange  rate  premium  even  with  a13
relatively  open  trade  regime.  Thuas  it  is  difficult  to  link  BMP  with  any
single  policy.
We  use  a  measure  of  the  black  market  premium  constructed  by  Jong-
wha  Lee  that  improves  upon  the  measure  used  in  the  LR. Lee  precisely
matches  the  date  at  which  the  official  end  black  market  exchange  rates
are  compared  to  better  calculate  the  black  market  premium  for  each
country.  As  shown  in  Table  2,  BMP  has  a  robust  negative  correlation  with
long-run  growth.  Though  difficult  to  interpret  precisely,  this  result
suggests  a  negative  association  between  international  distortions  end
growth.  As  shown  in  Graph  3,  there  are  three  countries  with  BIP  values
that  appear  to  constitute  outliers  (Ghana,  Burma,  and  Uganda).  Excluding
these  countries  alone  does  not  change  the  robust  finding."
5. Financial  Policv  indicators
The  traditional  view  of  financial  intermediaries  depicts  these
institutions  as  passive  coordinators  between  households  who  save  and
businesses  which  invest.  In  contraot,  new  research  suggests  an  intrinsic
link  between  financial  Intermediaries  and  economic  growth.  '2  This  new
view  posits  that  economies  with  more  developed  and  more  efficient
financial  systems  will  be  able  to  more  effectively  allocate  savings  to
the  best  investments.  This  in  turn  leads  to  increased  productivity,
potentially  higher  savings  rates,  and  faster  growth.
To examine  the  relationship  between  financial  policy  and  growth,  we
use  three  variables  constructed  by  King  and  Levine  (1992a)  to  reflect  the
level  of  financial  sector  development.  To  represent  the  size  of  the
financial  system,  we  uso  LLY, the  ratio  of  liquid  liabilities  to  GDP.'"
As  shown  in  Table  3,  LLY  earns  the  robust  classification.  The
significant,  positive  partial  correlation  between  growth  and  LLY shows
that  countries  with  larger  per  capita  growth  rates  tend  to  have  larger14
financial  systems.  Omitting  the  outliers  depicted  in  Graph  4  does  not
alter  this  result.
To examine  the  relationship  between  growth  and  the  types  of
financial  intermediaries  that  are  conducting  financial  intermediation,  we
examine  the  variable  BANK,  which  equals  deposit  money  bank  domestic
credit  divided  by  deposit  money  banks  domestic  credit  plus  central  bank
domestic  credit.  Again  confirming  the  findings  in  King  and  Levine
(1992c),  BANK  is  positively  and  robustly  correlated  with  long-run  growth.
Finally,  to  examine  the  importance  of  where  the  financial  system
allocates  credit,  we  perform  the  EBA  on  the  variable  PRIVATE,  which
equals  the  credit  to  the  private  sector  divided  by  total  domestic  credit.
Once  again,  PRIVATE  enters  with  a  positive  and  robust  coefficient.  These
findings  help  support  the  new  view  of  the  role  of  financial  intermediary
services  in  long-run  growth.
_11.  TRYING  TO FIND FACTS: AN EXAMPLE
1.  Setup
Arguably,  the  single  most  studied  issue  in  economics  is  the
relationship  between  money  and  economic  activity."'  rheory  suggests
that  inflation  may  affect  growth  by  influencing  capital  accumulation,
inducing  agents  to  shift  out  of  socially  productive  endeavors  into  rent-
seeking  activities,  or  causing  people  to  substitute  out  of  money  exchange
into  transactions  technologies  that  require  more  time  and  effort.
Similarly,  inflation  may  influence  investment  decisions  by  increasing
uncertainty.  In  addition  to  the  many  existing  models,  many  more  could
(and  certainly  will  be)  created  that  exemplify  the  linkages  between
inflation  and  long-run  growth.
Perhaps  just  as  important  as  the  debates  surrounding  theoretical
models  of  inflation  and  growth  is  the  generally  accepted  policy15
conclusion  that  inflation  is,  in  most cases,  bad for  long-run  growth. A
poll  of economists  would  probably  find  us recommending  that  coterie
paribus  lower  inflation  is better  than  higher  inflation. If  we went to a
country  with a 100  percent  inflation,  we would  tend  to recommend  that  the
country  pursue  policies  designed  to reduce  the  inflation  rate.  Moreover,
interrnational  organizations  in the  business  of giving  economic  policy
advice  would,  almost  unanimously,  argue  that  a  policy  of lower  inflation
is  better  than  a  policy  of higher  inflation;  one  rarely  sees  the
International  Monetary  Fund  or the  World  Bank  recommanding  that countries
increase  their  inflation  rates. Given  this  uncharacteristically  unified
view among  economists  and  policy  analysts,  we should  expect  a  negative
relationship  between  growth  and  inflation  to "jump-out"  at us from  the
data.  Yet,  no empirical  evidence  strongly  supports  the  contention  that
countries  with  higher  inflation  rates  tend  to have slower  long-run  growth
rates  ceteris  paribus. A cross-country  analysis  of the  relationship
between  growth  and inflation,  therefore,  offers  a particularly  appealing
opportunity  to illustrate  a few  of the  difficulties  inherent  in trying  to
identify  the "facts"  concerning  policy  and  growth.
2. Initial  findings
In a cross-section  of f02  countries,  the  correlation  between  the
average  annual  real  per  capita  growth  rate (GYP)  and  the  average  annual
inflation  rate (PI)  over  the  1960-1989  period  is -0.17  with a P-value  of
0.10.  Though  weak, any  model  would  suggest  controlling  for  other  factors
when examining  the  relationship  between  inflation  and growth.
Thus,  we run  a regression  of GYP  on PI including  the  logarithm  of
real  per  capita  GDP  in 1960  (LYO)  to control  for  initial  income,  the
logarithm  of the  secondary  school  enrollment  rate in 1960  (SEC)  to
control  for  initial  investment  in  human  capital,  and  the  number  of
revolutions  and  coups  over  the 1960-89  period  (REVC)  to control  for16
political  instability.  1 The  results  presented  in  Table  1  suggest  that
Initially  rich  countries  grow  more  slowly  than  initially  poorer
countries,  that  those  countries  that  began  the  thirty  year  period  with
more  students  enrolled  in  secondary  schools  grow  faster  than  countries
with  lower  secondary  school  enrollment  rates,  and  that  countries  that
experienced  more  revolutione  and  coups  grew  more  slowly  than  more  stable
societies.  But,  the  regression  results  presented  in  Table  4  indicate
that  inflation  is  not  significantly  related  to  long-run  growth  at
standard  significance  levels  as  the  t-statistic  for  the  coefficient  on
inflation  is  only  0.58. Thus,  a  simple  negative  association  between
inflation  and  growth  still  does  not  "jump-out"  at  us."
3.  Outliers:  l,fUtion  areater  than  80  Percent  per  annum
The  relationship  between  inflation  and  growth  may,  however,  be
discontinuous  or  non-linear.  Consider,  for  example,  two  alternative
hypotheses  about  the  growth-inflation  relationship.  First,  inflation
rates  may  have  to  reach  extremely  high  levels  before  people  significantly
alter  how  they  allocate  their  time  and  resources.  Thus,  marginal  changes
in  moderate  inflation  rates  - say  from  one  to two  percent  - may  not be
negatively  associated  with  growth,  but  very  high  inflation  rates  - say
over  80  percent  - may  be  associated  with  a  break-down  in  normal  economic
relationships  and  slower  long-run  growth  rates.  We call  this  the  "high-
pi"  hypothesis  since  the  greek  letter  pi  often  represents  inflation.
Alternatively,  people  in  countries  with  very  high  inflation  for
very  long  periods  may become  inured  to  inflation  and  develop  a  host  of
mechanisms  for  coping  with  inflation,  so  that  growth  is  unrelated  to  very
high  inflation.  Changes  in  inflation  in  moderate  inflation  countries
may,  however,  be  negatively  associated  with  growth  since  moderate
inflation  countries  have  not  become  "desensitized."  We  call  this  the
desensitize  hypothesis.17
These  two  hypothesee  obviously  do  not  cover  the  full  range  of
potential  explanations  relationship  between  inflation  and  growth.
Furthermore,  perspectives  on  the  inflation-growtht  nexus  should  be
exemplified  in  models  that  clarify  hypotheses  and  suggest  appropriate
econometric  specifications. 17  Here,  we  use  simple  dummy  variable
procedures  to  identify  and  control  for  countries  with  very  high  inflation
rates.  We  allow  countries  with  very  high  inflation  rates  to  have
different  slope  and  intercept  coefficients  from  moderate  inflation
countries.  Then,  we test  versions  of  the  high-pi  and  desensitize
hypotheses.
Consider  the  simple  scatter  plot  of  the  average  annual  Inflation
rates  for  102  non-oil  producing  countries  in  Graph  5. There  are  clearly
outliers  in  the  sample,  but  where  should  one  draw  the  line  between  high
and  moderate?  As  can  be  seen  in  the  scatter  plot,  the  inflation  rates  of
both  80  and  40  percent  suggest  relatively  clear  demarcations.  We  examine
both.
First  define  high  inflation  as  those  countries  with  inflation  rates
over  80  percent.  Define  the  dummy  variable  HIPI80  as  having  a  value  of  1
for  those  countries  with  average  inflation  rates  greater  than  80  percent
over  the  1960-1989  period  and  a  value  of  0 otherwise.  We  run  the
regression:
GrP  - PC  +  0LRGDP + 03LSEC  + p4"RC  +  IPuzZ80  +  P6PI*HZPI8O +  ,PI.  (3)
The  coefficient  on  HIPI80,  8,,  indicates  whether  countries  with  inflation
rates  over  80  percent  per  annum  have  a  different  intercept  than  countries
with  inflation  rates  of  less  than  80  percent.  The  regression  defined  in
equation  (3)  also  permits  the  slope  coefficient  on  inflation  to  differ18
between  high  and  non-high  inflation  countries. The  regression  implies
that  a  marginal  increase  in inflation  is associated  with a change  in  per
capita  growth  defined  by
=  P 6HXP180  + P7
aGY,P  l  0.pxO_1  =  P6  + P7  (4)
aG  IH:IPIGoO =  7-
Thus,  if  P 6 is significantly  different  from  zero,  high inflation
countries  respond  differently  from  non-high  inflation  countries  to
changes  in  the inflation  rate.  If &  plus  p,  is  not significantly
different  from zero,  then  a  marginal  increase  in inflation  in a high
inflation  country  is not  associated  with a change  in real  per  capita  GDP.
Regression  2 of Table  4 incorporates  these  new  variables  and
demonstrates  a  potentially  eppealing  "finding."  When  we define  high
inflation  as countries  with average  annual  inflation  rates  over  the  1960-
1989  period  of greater  than  80  percent,  we find  support  for the
desensitize  hypothesis;  very  high inflation  is  not  negatively  associated
with growth,  but  increases  in inflation  in  moderate  inflation  countries
are  negatively  linked  with growth. If a  country  such  as Italy,  with a
thirty  year average  annual  inflation  rate  of 10  percent  instead  had an
average  inflation  rate  of 5  percent,  this  regression  (taken  literally)
implies  that  Italy  would  have grown  an extra  0.2  percent  per  year in  per
capita  terms.  Cumulating  over  thirty  years,  this  means  that  Italy's  per
capita  income  in 1990  would  be about  1.3  million  Lira  higher.'  These
results  are  consistent  with the  story  that  countries  with high inflation
rates  over  30 years  become  "desensitized"  to inflation,  but countries19
with  moderate  inflation  rates  exhibit  a  significant  negative  relationship
between  growth  and  inflation.
4.  Outliers:  Inflation  greater  than  40  percent  ner  annum
In  coutrast,  when  we  define  high  inflation  as  countries  with
average  inflation  greater  than  40  percent,  we  find  evidence  for  the  high-
pi  hypothesis;  countries  with  very  high  inflation  rates  have  slower
growth,  but  inflation  increases  in  moderate  inflation  countries  are  not
negatively  linked  to growth  (regression  3 in Table  4).19  Thus,  using  40
percent  inflation  as  the  definition  of  "high"  leads  to  a  different
conclusion  from  when  we  defined  "high"  as  inflation  greater  than  80
percent  per  annum.
S.  Resolution:  The  "over-im2ortance"  of  a  counle  of  countries?
The  dichotomous  interpretations  evoked  by  the  two  outlier  choices
warrant  some  additional  digging.  One  or  some  of  the  five  countries  with
inflation  between  401  and  802  are  causing  the  coefficients  in  the
regressions  to  jump  around.  These  countries  are  Israel,  Nicaragua,
Uganda,  Uruguay  and  Zaire.  When  these  countries  are  included  as  high
inflation  countries,  we  conclude  that  (1)  high  inflation  is  negatively
associated  with  growth,  but  (2)  increases  in  inflation  in  moderate-
inflation-countries  are  not  linked  to  growth.  On  the  other  hand,  if
these  five  countries  are  not  counted  as  high  inflation  countries,  we
conclude  that  (1)  high  inflation  is  not  negatively  associated  with
growth,  but  (2)  increases  in  inflation  in  moderate-iuflation-cot.atries
are  negatively  linked  to  growth.
Of  these  five  crucial  countries,  two  experienced  extreme  political
disruptions  over  the  sample  period:  Uganda  and  Nicaragua.  Do we want  the
experiences  in  Uganda and  Nicaragua  to  determine  our  opinion  of  the
relationship  between  growth  and  inflation?  We believe  that  most20
economists  would  feel  uncomfortable  with  the  complex  events  that  occurred
in  Uganda  and  Nicaragua  playing  such  a  pivotal  role.
To  test  whether  these  two  countries  are  responsible  for  the
variations  in  results,  the  same  regressions  are  run  excluding  these
countries.  Support  for  both  hypotheses  breaks  down  at  the  0.05
significance  level.  Removal  of  both  countries  causes  a  reversion  co  the
original  results  that  inflation  is  unrelated  to  growth  (regressions  2A
and  3A  in  Table  4). These  results  demonstrate  that  it  is  difficult  to
find  "facts."  Unless  researchers  study  the  sensitivity  of  their  results
to  small  variations  in  the  sample  of  countries  and  changes  in  the
conditioning  information  set,  the  results  should  be  regarded  with
skepticism.
6.  Ceteris  varibus
Finally,  we think  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  the  relationship
between  inflation  and  growth  depends  importantly  on which  explanatory
variables  are  included  in  an  attempt  to  hold  other  things  equal.  For
example,  in  the  last  regression  which  defines  high  inflation  as  greater
than  80 percent  but  excludes  Nicaragua  and  Uganda  (regression  2A),
regression  5  indicates  that  when we add  the  ratio  of  government
consumption  expenditures  to  GDP  (GOV),  we  again  find  support  for  the
desensitize  hypothesis;  inflation  becomes  significantly  negatively
correlated  with  growth  in  moderate  inflation  countries.  But,  regression
6 shows  that  when  we  include  both  GOV  and  TRD,  inflation  is  not
significantly  related  to  growth  "ceteris  paribus."  Thus,  the  cloice  of
the  conditioning  information  set,  i.e.,  the  definition  of  ceteris
paribus,  importantly  alters  the  conclusions  one  would  draw  on  the
relationship  between  growth  and  inflation.
Besides  forming  the  conclusion  that  inflation  is  not  robustly
linked  to  growth,  this  evidence  suggests  that  any  link  between  policies21
and  long-run  growth  must  be  scrutinized  carefully.  The  investigating
economist  can  easily  "find"  several  distinct  but  appealing  "facts."  Not
only  must  the  result  be  robust  to  variations  in  the  explanatory
variables,  but  it  must  also  be  checked  for  outliers,  changes  in  the
deflnition  of  an  outlier,  and  for  small  variations  in  the  sample. 20
IV.  BROAD  POLICY  INDXES AND  REGIMES
The results  thus  far  are  disturbing.  Except  for  the  black  market
premium  and  the  indicators  of  the  development  of  the  domestic  financial
system,  there  is  not  a  strong  statistical  association  between  an
assortment  of  economic  indicators  and  long-run  growth.  The  macroeconomic
policy  indicators  are  not  strongly  linked  to  growth,  indicators  of  trade
performance  are  also  not  closely  tied  to  growth,  and  the  strong  negative
association  between  growth  and  the  black  market  premium  is  difficult  to
interpret  since  the  black  market  premium  reflects  many  policies.  Yet,
when  giving  policy  recommendations,  most  economists  would  still  argue
that  "macroeconomic  stability"  and  "openness  to  the  international  market
place"  help  countries  grow  faster.  Where the  term  "macroeconomic
stability"  refers  to  a  conglomerate  evaluation  of  the  macroeconomic
environment  and  not  any  one  indicator;  and,  "openness  to  the
international  market  place"  refers  to  a  conglomeration  of  tariff,  non-
tariff,  and  exchange  rate  policies  meant  to  quantify  the  ease  with  which
residents  can  interact  with  the  rest  of  the  world. Therefore,  listead  of
examining  the  partial  correlation  between  individual  indicators  and
growth,  it  may be  worthwhile  studying  the  relationship  between  indexes
designed  to  measure  the  overall  macroeconomic  environment  and  the  overall
openness  to  international  interactions.  Furthermore,  these  indexes  allow
us  to  study  policy  regimes.22
Levine  and  Ronelt  (1992)  use  factor  analysis  to  construct
international,  macroeconomic,  and  uncertainty  indexes  by  extracting  the
largest  principle  component  from  a  group  of  individual  indicators.  They
find  that  none  of  these  indexes  is  robustly  correlated  with  long-run
growth.  We try  a  more  subjective  approach.
1.  Conalomerate  indexes
We  form  a  conglomerate  index  for  international,  financial  and
macroeconomic  policy  indexes.  Each  of  these  indexes  is  composed  of
transformed  variables. After  removing  all  outliers  in the  sample  as
defined  in  Graphs  1-5,21  each  variable  (V)  which  is  to  be  incorporated
into  an  index  is  transformed  as  follow.s
TI(V)  - (Vi  ABS (WAN  (V))  )  /  AS  (MEAN  (V)  ),
where  i  indicates  a  country,  ABS  is  the  absolute  value  operator,  and  MEAN
(V)  represents  the  mean  of  the  variable  V across  countries.  Therefore,
the  transformation  involves  a  standardization  of  each  series  around  the
mean  of  the  series.  If  the  value  of  V is  exactly  at  the  mean,  the  value
of  T(V)  is  zero. A  value  of  V above  the  mean  corresponds  to  a  value  of
T(V)  greater  than  zero.
We  wanted  growth  to  be  positively  associated  - from  an  intuitive
perspective  - with  higher  values  of  the  transformed  variables.  Thus,  for
variables  such  as  inflation  and  the  black  market  premium,  which  are
thought  to  be  negatively  correlated  with  growth,  the  transformation  is
multiplied  by  negative  one. Therefore,  countries  with  a  high  fiscal
surglus  relative  to  the  mean  will  have  a  positive  value  for  the
transformed  variable  while  countries  with  high  inflation  relative  to  the
mean  will  have  a  negative  value  for  the  transformed  variable.23
The  separate  international,  finance,  and  macro  indexes  are  formed
by  summing  the  pertinent  transformed  variables.  The  international  index,
INTL,  is  composed  of  the  transiormed  BMP  and  TRD,  the  finance  index,
FINANCE, is  the  sum  of  transformed  LLY,  BANK  and  PRIVATE,  and  the  macro
index,  MACRO,  is  the  sum  of  the  transformed  PI and  SURPLUS.  As  mentioned
before,  these  indexes  are  formed  so  that  a higher  value  of  the  index
intuitively  corresponds  to  higher  growth.
2. Results
As an initial  test  of the  partial  correlation  between  these  indexes
and  growth,  these  variables  vere included  in the  basic  regressions  shown
earlier. Table  5 shows  that in  this  basic  framework,  each index  is
positively,  sigaificantly  correlated  with growth. However,  when all
three  indexes  are  included  together,  only  FINANCE  remains  significant  at
the  0.05  level  (MACRO  is significant  at the  0.08  level  and  INTL at the
0.12 level). Still,  these  results  suggest  that  a  "sound"  economic
environment,  defined  in terms  of financial,  international,  and
macroeconomic  policies  is  positively  linked  with  growth.'
We also  created  and  attempted  to examine  the  importance  of policy
regimes. All three  of the  indexes  were ranked  in descending  order  and
then  the sample  was divided  in  half.  For  each  index,  the  top  half  of the
countries  (those  with larger  indexes  and  thus  "better"  policies)  were
given  a  value  of 1  while the  bottom  half (those  with "worse"  policies)
were given  a  value  of 0.  Consequently,  this  categorization  defines  eight
different  policy  regimes. For  example,  countries  can  have a 1,C,0  which
means good  FINANCE  but  bad  INTL  and  MACRO,  while 1,0,1  indicates  good
FINANCE  and  MACRO  but bad  INTL,  and  so forth.
We report  the  average  growth  rate  of the  countries  in each regime
in Table  6.  Those  countries  with the  "best"  economic  regime  (1,1,1)  have
an average  growth  rate three  times  that  of the  "worst"  regime  (0,0,0).24
One  of the  most ptominent  features  of this  analysis  is the  strength  of
the  relationship  between  the  measures  of financial  sector  development  and
growth. For  example,  going  from  the  "all  bad"  regime  (0,0,0)  to good
FINANCS  but  bad INTL  and  MACRO  doubles  the  average  growth  rate.  In
general,  the  effects  of having  a good  versus  bad  INTL or  MACRO  rank  are
mixed.
VI.  CONCLUSION
We Identify  two  broad  findings. First,  cross  country  regressions
show  that  indicators  of financial  development  are strongly  associated
with long-run  growth. Since  changes  in  these  financial  development
indicators  are linked  to changes  in financial  sector  policies  (see  e.g.,
King and  Levine,  1993b),  the link  between  financial  sector  policies  and
long-run  growth  deserves  more attention. Second,  it is extremely
difficult  to identify  believable  links  between  a  wide assortment  of
indicators  of individual  policies  and  long-run  growth,  although  there  is
some  evidence  that  general  indicators  of international  distortions  are
negatively  associated  with growth. Most  notably,  we could  not  find
robust  ties  between  indicators  of  monetary  or fiscal  policy  and  long-run
growth.
The  empirical  connection  between  policy  indicators  and  growth  seems
to be quite  sensitive  to slight  alterations  in the  right-hand-side
variables  and  to small  changes  in the  sample  of countries. Future  cross
country  work on the  relationship  between  policy  and  long-run  grcJth  will
need to develop  innovative  ways of improving  available  policy  indicators,
defining  policy  regimes,  and  examining  interactions  among  policies  and
their  effects  on growth. Easterly  and  Rebelo  (1993),  for  example,
importantly  improve  existing  measures  of a range  of fiscal  revenue  and
expenditure  indicators  for  many  countries  over  the 1960-1990  period.25
Finally,  however,  broad  cross  country  regression  analyses  of  policy  and
growth  will  need  to  be  closely  integrated  with  country  case  studies  and
firm  level  investiga  ions.26
NOTES
1.  Moreover,  when studies  measure  the  average  inflation  rate  or average
tax rate  over  the  last  30 years,  they  do not  distinguish  between,  say,  a
hyper-inflationary  episode  lasting  a few  year.  and sustained  high
inflation  lasting  30 years.
2. Levine  and  Renelt  (1992)  use  a different  specification  from  Barro
(1991). The  differences  are  noted  below.
3. See  Levine  and  Renelt  (1991).
4. See  Leamer  (1973,  1983,  1985)  and  Leamer  and  Leonard  (1983).
5.  Note  that this  basic  set  of always  included  variables  is different
from  those  used in  LR.  When  GYP is the  dependent  variable,  LR's I
variables  are initial  income,  initial  secondary  school  enrollment,
population  growth,  and the  ratio  of investment  to  GDP.  LR also
investigate  the  robustness  of the  partial  correlation  between  the
investment  share  and  each  H variable.
6. In addition,  we do not include  the  ratio  of real  government
consumption  less  defense  and  education  expenditures  to GDP,  which is part
of Barro's  (1991)  set  of control  variables,  because  (1)  this  fiscal
variable  is a contemporaneous  economic  policy  indicator  and  not a
variable  to control  for  initial  conditions  or political  stability  and (2)
it is averaged  over the  1970-85  period  rather  than  over  the 1960-89
period  that  we examine. We do,  however,  examine  this  fiscal  expenditure
variable  as an M variable.
7.  For the  pool of Z  variables,  LR use  PI,  STPI,  GOV,  TRD,  REVC, the
growth  rate  of domestic  credit,  and  the  standard  deviation  of the  growth
rate of  credit.27
8.  When the  average  growth  rate  of domestic  credit  (GDC)  is  added  to the
pool of Z  variables,  HSGVXDXE  changes  to the  classification  fragile:  2.
The addition  of LLY  and  GDC  to the  base regression  causes  1  to  become
insignificant.
9. See  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1990,  1991)  and  Rivera-Batiz  and  Romer
(1991).
10.  As LR show,  very similar  results  emerge  with the  export  to  GDP ratio
or the import  to  GDP ratio.
11.  If these  outliers  are  excluded  and  the  standard  deviation  of domeetic
credit  growth,  STGDC,  is added  to the  Z variable  pool,  BMP  becomes
"fragile"  when PI and  STGDC  are  both included.
When the  EBA  is done  using  the specification  in  Levine  and  Renelt
(1992),  the  partial  correlation  between  BMP  and  both growth  and  the
investment  share  are  fragile. Thus,  the  difference  between  the  findings
in this  paper  and  LR is a product  of  using  different  I-variables,  not
from  using  a different  measure  of the  black  market  exchange  rate.
12.  See  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990),  Bencivenga  and  Smith (1991),
Levine  (1991),  Roubini  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1991,  1992),  King and  Levine
(1992a,b,c,d),  Saint-Paul  (1992),  and  DeGregorio  and  Guidotti  (1992).
But, also  see  Dornbusch  and  Reynoso  (1989)  for  a different  perspective.
13.  Liquid  liabilities  equals  M1 plus interest  bearing  liabilities  of the
banking  system,  plus demand  and  interest  bearing  liabilities  of  non-bank
financial  intermediaries.
14.  See  the  extensive  review  by Orphanides  and  Solow  (1990)  and the
papers  by Fischer  (1979),  Stockman  (1981),  and  DeGregorio  (1991,  1992).
Also, see  Fischer  (1992)  for  a study  of the  ties  between  macroeconomic
factors  and  growth.
15.  Adding  the  initial  literacy  rate,  initial  primary  school  enrollment,28
the  number  of assassinations,  or the  number  of  wars to this  control  set
of  variables  does  not  change  this  paper's  results.
16.  We only  look  at the  average  annual  inflation  rate.  This rate  may be
strongly  influenced  by a few  observations  and  therefore  not adequately
represent  the  inflation  rate  in any  time  period. We get similarly
inconclusive  results  when  we use  the  standard  deviation  of inflation
instead  of the  average  inflation  rate.
17.  Similarly,  as discussed  in Section  II,  there  are  so  many endemic
problems  with cross-country  analy.es  of growth  that  we should  not  push
the  econometrics  beyond  the  low  quality  and  limited  interpretability  of
available  data.
18.  Italy's  GDP  per  capita  in 1990  was about  22.7  million  Lira,  and its
average  real  per  capita  growth  rate  over  the  thirty  years  between  1960
and  1990  was  about  3.5  percent  per  annum.
19.  The coefficient  indicates  that  countries  in  the  HIPI40  group  grow  an
average  0.02z  slower  per  year.  While  statistically  significant,  this is
economically  minute.
20.  Also see  the  paper  by Easterly,  Kremer,  Summers,  and  Pritchett  (1992)
that  examines  other  sensitivity  analyses.
21.  The  results  do not depend  on removing  the  outliers.
22.  Only FINANCE  is  robust  when the  extreme  bounds  analysis  is  performed.29
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Sensitivity  Results  for  Fiscal  Policy  Indicators
Dependent  Variable:  Growth  Rate  of Real  Per  Capita  GDP 1960-1989
Beta  Standard  Error T-Statistic  Countries  R  Other  Variables  Robust/FraRile  (-)
Government  Consumption  Share  (GOV)
High  0.026  0.034  0.77  96  0.41  PI,STPI,BMP Base  0.022  0.034  0.67  99  0.37  Fragile:O Low  0.004  0.034  0.13  97  0.42  PI,STPI,TRD
Government  Consumption  Share,  less  education  and  defense  1970-85  (HSGVXDXE) High  -9.429  5.26  1.79  90  0.26  LLY.TRD.STPI Base  -15.665  4.98  3.15  92  0.20  Fragile:3 Low  -12.994  5.00  2.60  84  0.36  BMP,PI,STPI
Government  Fiscal  Surplus  (SURY)
High  0.118  0.056  2.10  75  0.50  PI,STPI,LLY Base  0.086  0.052  1.65  79  0.39  Fragile:  O Low  0.063  0.055  1.15  74  0.48  STPI,TRD,BIMP
Public  Sector  Fiscal  Surplus  (1970-88)  (PSSUR)
High  20.083  7.68  2.62  48  0.45  LLY,R  D,BMP Base  14.418  7.93  1.82  49  0.30  Fragile:0 Low  9.219  9.00  1.02  49  0.36  TRD,PI,STPI
Notes:
The  base  beta  is  the  estimated  coefficient  from  the  regression  with  the  variable  of  interest  (M-variable) and  the  always  included  variables  (I-variables).  The  I-variables,  are LYO,  LSEC,  and  REVC. The  high  beta  is the  estimated  coefficient  from  the  regression  with  the  extreme  high  bound  (b.  + 2-standard  deviations);  the  low beta is  the  coefficient  from  the  regression  with the  extreme  lower  bound. The  "other  variables"  are  the  Z-variables  included  in  the  base  regression  that  produce  the  extreme  bounds. The underlined  variables are the minimum additional  variables that make the coefficient  of  interest insignificant  or change  sign.
The Robust/Fragile  designation  indicates  whether  the  variable  of interest  is robust  or fragile.  If fragile,  the  column  indicates  how  many  additional  variables  need  to  be  added  before  the  variable  is  insignifcant or of the  wrong  sign. A zero  indicates  the  coefficient  is  insignificant  with only  the  I-variables  included. If robust,  the  text  provides  information  about  further  robustness  tests.
33TABLE  2
Sensitivity  Results  for  Monetary  and  Trade  Policy  Indicators
Dependent  Variable:  Growth  Rate  of  Real  Per  Capita  GDP
Beta  Standard  Error T-Statistic  Countries  R'  Other  Variables  Robust/IFratile  (M)
Inflation  (PI)
High  -0.00003  0.00003  0.93  94  0.45  TRD,BMP,GOV
Base  -0.00002  0.00003  0.57  102  0.36  FragilesO Low  -0.00003  0.00003  0.93  94  0.45  TRD,BMP,GOV
Standard  Deviation  of Inflation  (STPI)
High  -0.000006 0.000006  0.97  88  0.56  BMP,TRD,GOV
Base  -0.000002 0.000008  0.23  102  0.36  Fragile:O Low  -0.000006 0.000006  0.97  88  0.56  BMP,TRD,GOV
Imports  plus  Exports  Share  (TRD)
High  0.013  0.005  2.53  97  0.42  PI,STPI,GOV
Base  0.011  0.005  2.36  100  0.38  Fragile:1 Low  0.001  0.005  0.12  91  0.51  PI,STPI,LLY
Black  Market  Premium  (BHP)
High  -0.0079  0.0035  2.27  96  0.41  PI,STPI,WV Base  -0.0084  0.0027  3.07  98  0.41  Robust Low  -0.0079  0.0035  2.27  96  0.41  PI,STPL,GOV
Notes:
The  base  beta  is  the  estimated  coefficient  from  the  regression  with  the  variable  of  interest  (N-variable) and  the  always  included  varia1.es  (I-variables).  The  I-variables,  are LYO,  LSEC,  and  REVC. The  high  beta  is the  estimated  coefficient  from  the  regression  with  the  extreme  high  bound  (, + 2-standard  deviations);  the  low beta  is the  coefficient  from  the  regression  with  the  extreme  lower  bound.
The  "other  variables"  are  the  Z-variables  included  in  the  base  regression  that  produce  the  extreme  bounds. The underlined  variables are the minimum additional  variables that make the coefficient  of interest insignificant  or  change  sign.
The Robust/Fragile  designation  indicates  whether the  variable  of interest  is robust  or fragile. If fragile,  the  column  indicates  how  many  additional  variables  need  to  be  added  before  the  variable  is  insignifeant or of the  wrong  sign. A zero  indicates  the  coefficient  is insignificant  with  only  the  I-variables  included. If robust,  the  text  provides  information  about  further  robustness  tests.
34TABLE  3
Sensitivity  Results  for  Financial  Policy  Indicators
Dependent  Variable:  Growth  Rate  of  Real  Per  Capita  GDP 1960-1989
Beta  Standard  Error  T-Statistic  Countries  R'  Other  Variables  Robust/Fratile  (L)
Liquid  Liabilities  Share (LLY)
High  0.029  0.007  4.31  89  0.56  PI,STPI,GOV Base  0.029  0.007  4.44  92  0.52  Robust Low  0.025  0.007  3.82  88  0.56  PI,TRD,GOV
Deposit  Money  Bank  Domestic  Credit  Share  (BANK)
High  0.038  0.011  2.76  79  0.54  PI,STPI,TRD Base  0.038  0.012  3.19  83  0.48  Robust Low  0.038  0.011  2.76  79  0.54  PI,STPI,TRD
Claims  on Private  Sector  to Total  Domestic  Credit  (PRIVATE)
High  0.031  0.011  2.96  82  0.47  PI,STPI,TRD Base  0.031  0.010  3.04  82  0.46  Robust Low  0.025  0.010  2.40  79  0.54  STPI,TRD,BHP
Notest
The  base  beta is the  estimated  coefficient  from  the  regression  with the  variable  of interest  (K-variable) and  the  always  included  variables  (I-variables).  The  I-variables,  are LYO,  LSEC,  and  REVC. The  high  beta  is  the estimated  coefficient  from  the  regression  with  the extreme  high  bound  (P,  +  2-standard  deviations);  the  low  beta is  the  coefficient  from  the  regression  with the  extreme  lower  bound. The  "other  variables"  are  the  Z-variables  included  in  the  base  regression  that  produce  the  extreme  bounds. The  underlined  variables  are  the  minimum  additional  variables  that  make  the  coefficient  of interest  insignificant or  change  sign.
The  Robust/Fragile  designation  indicates  whether  the  variable  of  interest  is  robust  or  fragile.  If fragile, the  column  indicates  how many  additional  variables  need  to  be added  before  the  variable  is insignifcant  or  of  the wrong  sign. A zero  indicates  the  coefficient  is  insignificant  with  only  the  I-variables  included.  If  robust,  the text  provides  information  about  further  robustness  tests.
35TABLE  4
INFLATION  AND  GROWTW
Dependent  Variable: Growth  Rate  of Real  Per  Capita  GDP
regreesion#  1  2  3
obsorvations  102  102  102
indeDendent  variables
C  0.047**  0.051**  0.051**
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)
LYO  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.007**
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
LSEC  0.009**  0.009**  0.009W*
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
REYC  -0.023**  -0.023**  -0.023**
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)








PI  -0.00002  -0.00036**  -0.00038
(0.00003)  (0.00014)  (0.00026)
F-TESTI  0.027  0.979
(0.870)  (0.325)
R2  0.36  0.40  0.40
(standard  errors  in  parentheses)
*  significant  at the .10  level
**  significant  at the .05  level
LYO  - log  real  per  capita  GDP, 1960
LSEC  - log  secondary  school  enrollment  rate,  1960
REVC  - number  of  revolutions  and  coups  per  year
HIPM1X  - 1  for  countries  with  PI>XX,  0  otherwise
PI  - average  annual  inflation  rate
is  F-test  of  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  on  PI*HIPIX  and  PI sum  to zero
36TABLE  4, continued
INFLATION  AND  GROWTH
Dependent  Variablet Growth  Rate of Real  Per  Capita  GDP
regression#  2A  3A  4  5  6
observations  100  100  98  98  96
independent  variables
C  0.051**  0.051**  0.042**  0.050**  0.041**
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.0072)
LYO  -0.008**  -0.007** -0.007**  -0.009** -0.008**
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
LSEC  0.009**  0.009**  0.009**  0.010**  0.010**
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
REVC  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.016**  -0.018**  -0.011**
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)




HIPI80  -0.008  . -0.001  -0.006  0.001
(0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)
PI*HIPI80  0.00031*  . 0.00021  0.00033** 0.00021
(0.00017)  (0.00017)i (0.00016) (0.00016)
Pi  -0.00031*  -0.00038  -0.00022  -0.00033**  -0.00024
(0.00016)  (0.00026) (0.00016)  (0.00016) (0.00016)
TRD  . . 0.009*  . 0.011**
(0.005)  (0.005)
GOV  . . . 0.023  0.010
(0.034)  (0.034)
F-TEST'  0.017  0.351  0.008  0.190  0.686
(0.895)  (0.555)  (0.927)  (0.664)  (0.410)
0.38  0.38  0.39  0.40  0.43
(standard  errors  in  parentheses)
*  significant  at the .10  level
**  significant  at  the  .05  lavel
LYO  - log  real  per  capita  GDP,  1960
LSEC  - log  secondary  school  enrollment  rate,  1960
REVC  - number  of  revolutions  and  coupe  per  year
EIPIXX  - 1  for  countries  with  PI>XX,  0  otherwise
PI  - average  annual  inflation  rate
GOV  - government  consumption  as  shar.  of  GDP
TRD  - exports  +  imports  as share  of  GDP
Regression  2A(3A)  *-  Regression  2(3)  minus  Uganda  and  Nicaragua
1:  F-test  of hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  on PI*HIFPXM  and  PI sum  to zero
37TABLE 5
INDEXES  AND  GROWTE
Dependent  Variablet Growth  Rate  of Real Per  Capita  GDP
regression  1  1  2  3  4
observations  68  85  72  54
independent  variables:
C  0.057**  0.048**  0.047**  0.053**
(0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)
LYO  -0.010**  -0.009**  -0.009**  -0.011**
(0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)
LSEC  0.011**  0.009**  0.007**  0.008**
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
REVC  -0.014  -0.008  -0.006  0.009
(0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.010)
MACRO  0.004**  . . 0.003*
(0.002)  (0.002)
INTL  . 0.003**  . 0.002
(0.001)  (0.001)
FIN  . 0.004**  0.004**
(0.001)  (0.002)
R
2 0.38  0.39  0.46  0.52
(standard  errors  in parentheses)
*  significant  at the .10  level
**  significant  at the .05  level
LYO  - log  real  per capita  GDP, 1960
LSEC  - log  secondary  school  enrollment  rate,  1960
REVC  - number  of revolutions  and  coups  per  year
MACRO  - macroeconomic  index
INTL  - international  index
FIN  - financial index
38TABLS  6
POLICY RGIMES  AiND  GROWTH
FINANCIAL  INTIRNATIONAL MACROECONOIUC  GROWTH  COUNTRIlS
RANK  RANK  am
1  1  1  0.030  AUT,THA,FIN,DEU,
CYP,CAN,NOR,NLD,
TO,  FRA,PNG
1  1  0  0.027  PAN,JOR,IRL,PRT,
BEL,NZL,JAM,MYS,
MUSB,BRB
1  0  1  0.036  KOR,USA,AUS
1  0  0  0.020  TUN,SYR,ZAW,GUY,
GR.C  KEN,  TZA,HAR,
0  1  1  0.008  CHR,SER,NMD,MTI,
livo
0  1  0  0.018  GM,MLI,TGO
0  0  1  0.011  COL,SLV,DOMK,TH,
GTM,  PHL,BGD,BDI,
RWA,MDG
0  0  0  0.011  LKA,ZAR,TUR,SLE,
MWI,  IC
39Country  List
119  Country  Sample
1  AFG  Afghanistan  40  HTI  Haiti  80  PRY  Paraguay
2  DZA  Algeria  41  HND  Honduras  81  PER  Peru
3  AGO  Angola  42  HKG  Hong  Kong  82  PHL  Philippine
4  ARG  Argentina  43  ISL  Iceland  83  PRT  Portugal
b  AUS  AustralLa  44  IND  India  84  RWA  Rwanda
6  AUT  Austria  45  IDN  Indonesia  85  SAU  Saudi  Arab
7  BGD  Bangladesh  46  IRN  Iran  86  SEN  Senegal
8  BRB  Barbados  47  IRQ  Ira.  87  SLE  Sierra  Leo
9  BEL  Belglum  48  IRL  Ireland  88  SGP  Singapore
10  BOL  Bolivia  49  ISR  Israel  89  SOM  Somalia
11  BWA  Botswana  50  ITA  Italy  90  ZAF  South  Afri
12  BRA  Brazil  S1  JAM  Jamaica  91  ESP  Spain
13  BDI  Burundi  52  JAP  Japan  92  LKA  Sri  Lanka
14  CMR  Cameroon  53  JOR  Jordan  93  SDN  Sudan
15  CAN  Canada  54  KEN  Kenya  94  SWZ  Swaziland
16  CAF  Cent.  Afr.  Rep  55  KOR  Korea  95  SWE  Sweden
17  TCD  Chad  56  KWT  Kuwait  96  CHE  Switzerlan
18  CHL  Chile  57  LSO  Lesotho  97  SYR  Syria
19  COL  Colombia  58  LBR  Liberia  98  OAN  Taiwan
20  COG  Congo  59  LUX  Luxembourg  99  TZA  Tanzania
21  CRI  Costa  Rica  60  MDG  Madagascar  100  THA  Thailand
22  CIV  Cote  D'Ivoire  61  MWI  Malawi  101  TGO  Togo
23  CYP  Cyprus  62  MYS  Malaysia  102  TTO  Trin.  and
24  DEN  Denmark  63  MLI  Mali  103  TUN  Tunisia
25  DOM  Dominican  Rep.  64  MLT  Malta  104  TUR  Turkey
26  ECU  Ecuador  65  MRT  Mauritania  105  UGA  Uganda
27  EGY  Egypt  66  MUS  Mauritius  106  GBR  Great  Brit
28  SLV El  Salvador  67  MEX  Mexico  107  USA  United  Sta
29  ETH  Ethiopia  68  MAR  Morocco  108  URY  Uruguay
30  FJI  Fiji  69  MOZ  Mozambique  109  VEN  Venezuela
31  FIN  Finland  70  NLD  Netherland  110  YEM  Yemen
32  FRA  France  71  NZL  New  Zealan  111  ZAR  Zaire
33  GAB  Gabon  72  NIC  Nicaragua  112  ZMB  Zambia
34  GMB  Gambia  73  NER  Niger  113  ZWE  Zimbabwe
35  DEU  Germany  74  NGA  Nigeria  114  BUR  Burma
36  GHA  Ghana  75  NOR  Norway  115  GUY  Guyana
37  GRC  Greece  76  OMN  Oman  116  BEN  Benin
38  GTM  Guatemala  77  PAK  Pakistan  117  HVO  Burkina  Fa
39  GNB  Guinea-Bissau  78  PAN  Panama  118  NPL  Nepal
79  PNG  Pap.  New  G  119  SUR  Suriname
40Consolidated  Central  Government  Surplus  Divided  by GDP
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